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INTRODUCTION
In an era of shrinking high-risk private sector
research and development expenditures there is an
increasing dependence on government long-term
technology development. Public to private
technology transfer is steadily becoming a critical,
strategic component of U.S. economic growth - both
aerospace and non-aerospace. The National
Aeronautics and Space Administration's mission is
to develop aeronautical and space technologies and
explore the frontiers of space. It is also NASA's
mission to actively seek out non-aerospace
industries and companies with technological
problems or needs that might benefit from the
transfer or application of its special, slate-of-the-art
aerospace capabilities. Where it is within NASA's
capability, the agency will help companies
eliminate shortages of knowledge or solutions, and
possibly show the way to technological competitive
or strategic advantage. In this regard, the agency
plays an important role, along with other public
sector technology producers, in contributing long-
term. high-risk R&D inputs that help stimulate
investment and growth in the U.S. economy. The
NASA Commercial Technology Team (1994)
established a new, non-aerospace commercial
technology policy has been used as the guiding basis
for the development of this methodology.
The Commercial Technology Consultants program
(abbreviated to "CommTech'" program) was
developed and applied by NASA Glenn Research
Center in Cleveland, Ohio. This paper presents a
comprehensive review and assessment of the
program's demonstration or pilot cycle - from its
conception and initiation in early to mid-fiscal year
1995, and planned activities extending roughly three
years into the future. Market
research sources were used to initially gather
primary technological problems and needs data from
non-aerospace companies in three targeted industry
sectors: environmental, surface transportation, and
bioengineering. Company-supplied information
served as input data to activate or start-up an
internal, phased matchmaking process. This process
was based on technical-level relationship
exploration lollowed by business-level agreement
negotiations, and culminated with project
management and execution. Space Act Agreements
represented near-term outputs. Company product or
process commercialization derived from NASA
Glenn support and measurable economic effects
represented far-term outputs. The paper begins with
an overview of the program's obiective followed by
an overview of the input/output model. A
description of the core development and
implementation strategy is presented next. This is
followed by a presentation of the overall results of
the implementation phases. Finally, the program's
performance and comparative metrics are
summarized and conclusions arc drawn.
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
The goal of this initial CommTech program cycle
was to demonstrate the potential low-cost/high
productivity advantages of a demand-driven
technology transfer model. If successful, then this
"technology pull" approach could perhaps
complement or bca complete substitute for the
"technology push" methods that had been employed
throughout the agency to date. In practice,
CommTech would apply a "company-lcd'" strategy
to systematically foster, track and measure the
establishment, development and execution of I to 2-
year relationships between non-aerospace companies
and Glenn scientists and engineers (referred to in
this report as "lead participants").
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The CommTechprogramwasconceivedon the
premiseorunderstandingthat:
publicto privatetechnologytransferdrivenby
privatesector"'market"demand(or pull) is
potentiallymoreefficientandproductivethan
traditionaltechnology"push"approaches;
public to private, value-addedtechnology
transfer accrues best when public
technologies/capabilitiesareappliedto private
sectorproblems/needswhosesolutionsareeither
limitedorbeyondcurrentindustrycapabilities;
mostcompaniesthatoperatein non-aerospace
industrysectorsare generallyunfamiliarwith
NASA technologiesand are not in the
NASA/Glenncommunicationsloop;and
public sectorentitiesoperateundergeneral
policyguidelinesthat prohibitthe offeringof
services,which are alreadysuppliedin the
marketplacebyprivateor privatizedsources.
Basedonall theabove,theprogramwasdeveloped
withthefour-foldobjectiveto:
EnhanceGlenn'spositionas an accessible
nationaltechnologicalresourcefor all tax-
paying,"for-profit"companiesin the United
Statesregardlessof location;
Pro-actively identify companies with
product/processtechnology development
problems/needsthatarebeyondthecommercial
state-of-the-art,and which(to the bestof a
company'sandGlenn'scombinedknowledge)
havealoworzeropotentialof beingmetin the
commercialsuppliermarketplace;
Increasetheestablishmentof highqualitynon-
aerospacet chnologytransferrelationshipsviaa
controlled,structuredprocesswith clearly
definednearandfar-termdeliverables,including
clearprogramentryandexit-ways;
Broadenparticipationin the Agency'snon-
aerospacetechnologytransfermission by
providing a clear structure, which
accommodatesandsupportstheinvolvementof
GlennS&E'swhohavenothadtheopportunity
to participate.
PROGRAM PROCESS OVERVIEW
Figure I illustrates the basic eight-step (two staged -
explained in the next section) process used to
develop start-up and operate the CommTech
program.
(i) The NASA Glenn Commercial Technology
Office released a request to determine
product/process development problems/needs within
specially targeted non-aerospace industry sectors
(companies). Market research intermediaries were
used. (2/3) The intermediaries conducted primary
market surveys and (4) forwarded the results to the
CTO (CommTech) program manager. Surveys were
designed to produce respondents with a high "match
potential." Care was taken to limit company
expectations since it was known that CommTech
would only accommodate the interests of a few
company respondents (depending on the size of both
the companies' and lead participant responses) per
cycle. (5) The survey results were then used as input
data for an internal Glenn activity that identified
individual scientists and engineers. (6) Interested
S&E's admitted into the program proceeded to
engage companies to further understand their needs.
If requested, program funds were used (at the
discretion of participating S&E's) to demonstrate
their capabilities to companies that were unfamiliar
with Glenn. Every effort was made to avoid
subsidizing private sector commercial interests. (7)
If commercial potential were apparent, then a
company would be expected to fund the transfer
"Space Act Agreement" (mechanism) needed to
realize that potential. (8) The expectation was that
companies that participated would eventually
produce and commercialize new (or improved)
products or processes. These would incorporate
enabling or unique, state-of-the-art support and/or
technological contributions directly traceable to
NASA Glenn.
_hliqLallt for HOflalti, on _ | Market
NASA GRC v Research
CTO .d _ O.V. _.n= Sources
4"_
Stage 1
Figure 1. Start-up and process model.
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DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
STRATEGY
Program development and implementation was
conducted in two stages. Figure 2 portrays the two-
staged process schedule and all necessary activities
and outputs. Stage I consisted of six key activities
and was directed toward the development,
packaging and release of a program plan and a four-
part compilation (appendix) of company needs.
Stage 2 consisted of four phases with the ultimate
objective to match specific company needs with
Glenn capabilities and then establish and execute
agreements. The four phases of stage 2 were
entitled: I - Response and Participant Selection, II -
Company Relationship Exploration, III
Relationship Definition and Agreement, and IV -
Agreement Implementation and Execution. The
estimated duration of both phases II and II1 had a
built in slack of about 3 months considering the
inherent uncertainty associated with accomplishing
those objectives. Essentially, the rate at which a
lead participant transitioned from phases I1 to phase
III, and then finally to phase IV, largely depended on
a particular company's pace. Although it is implied
that companies were aware of the CommTech
process, this was not the case. For this first program
cycle, the process described in this report was only
known internally within NASA Glenn by those
familiar with the program plan (mai ',, prospective
and eventually only lead participant-
Program Development - Stage 1
As indicated earlier, the objective of stage I was to
prepare a program plan and develop the
accompanying appendix of company needs required
for use during phase I of stage 2. The program plan
was designed to present a comprehensive, end-to-
end description of the program and attract the
interest and commitment of Glenn scientists and
engineers' in becoming lead participants. A three-
part application was included within the plan lbr the
convenience of any prospective participant (i.e.,
scientist or engineer) to apply for entry. The
availability of an appendix with descriptions of
company problems/needs (discussed below) enabled
any interested scientist and/or engineer to apply and
compete in phase I for entry into CommTech's key
external interaction phases (II, III, and IV). Phase I
was counpetitive since a pool of limited funds (to be
used only for technology/capability demonstrations)
had to bc allocated to each applicant selected to
participate in phase II. A total of $230K was
budgeted to support requests from high potential
companies/clients lor technology/capability
demonstrations during phase 1I.
The NASA Technology Transfer Network members
consisting of the Far West Regional Technology
Transfer Center (RTTC), the Mid-Continental
RTTC, the Southeast RTTC, the Mid-West RTTC,
the Mid-Atlantic RTTC, the Northeast RTTC, and
Research Triangle Institute, were used to supply
primary market research data. Each network
member was tasked to
FY95 FY96 FY97
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Figure 2: Two-staged development and implementation schedule.
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identify45companies(fromwithintheirrespective
region'senvironmental,surfacetransportation,and
bioengineeringindustry sectors), and obtain
descriptionsof technologyproblemor needs. In
addition,bothbusiness-andtechnical-levelpoints-
of-contactweresoughtforeachcompany.
Companiesfromwithin theenvironmental,surface
transportation,andbioengineeringindustrysectors
werethe mainlocusof this first programcycle.
Theseindustrieswerethoughto havecompanies
with high potential synergies with Glenn
technologies.Both written correspondenceand
telephonesurvey instrumentswere specially
developedandemployed.Writtensurveysprovided
a basic,comprehensiveoutlineof NASAGlenn's
areas of technologyexpertise. This helped
companiesmakepreliminaryassessmentsaboutthe
potentialapplicabilityof NASAGlenn'saerospace
technologies/capabilities- andincreasedthe"match
potential."
Over 350 companiesprovidedinformationabout
their special (proprietaryor non-proprietary)
product/processdevelopmentproblemsor needs.In
addition, they also indicated which Glenn
technologies/capabilitiesareastheythoughtmight
bestservetheir needs. All surveyresultswere
forwardedtotheGlennprogram anager.Following
receiptof therawdata,a programplanandfour-part
appendixof companyneedswerefinalized.In total,
thefinalpackagecontained212pages:25pagesfor
theprogramplanand187pagesfor the complete
appendix.The appendixcontained142 company
technologyneedsprofiles, and was produced
primarilyto enableapplicantswithoutanyprevious
non-aerospacetechnologyexperienceto participate(andcompetc)in thephaseI process.
Program Implementation - Stage 2
Stage 2, the implementation stage, commenced on
March 24, 1995. After receiving the program
package in phasc I, interested scientists/engineers
responded by completing the three part application.
During this phase I application process, all
applicants were provided with company names and
technology needs descriptions - no specific names of
technical points-of-contact were given to avoid any
premature interaction. Applicants qualified for
phase II through the phase I process based mainly on
a measure and comparative analysis of the level of
commitment and interest indicated in their
application.
The first part of the application required applicants
to choose six companies from the appendix of
company needs. The choice of six companies was
an arbitrary figure, neither too few nor too many, and
was used to increase the chances for success in
phase II. The majority of applicants submitted
required six choices, however a few submitted less.
Applicants who were presently supporting companies
or had previously worked with companies on their
own had the option to enter up to three of those
companies (i.e., if they fell into one of CommTech's
target industry sectors). The other two parts of the
application gathered additional information to help
gauge each applicant's preparedness to participate,
and the degree to which he/she might reliably
commit time toward completing the objectives of
stage 2 - phases II and III, and most importantly
phase IV.
At this point, a lead participant choice of companies
in phase I became one of the more important factors
(among others) for success. In phase II, a lead
participant's ability to quickly understand a
company's particular non-aerospace culture,
communicate and follow through effectively, was
another factor for success. Most importantly, a
company's assessment of (and/or ability to assess)
the participant's proposed technology/capability
match was critical. Even with the maximum six
companies to help reduce the odds, it was
challenging for most participants to complete phase
1I.
At the start of phase II, each lead participant was
given market-need information (as provided in the
appendix) about each of his/her chosen companies.
Several participants selected some of the same
companies in phase I. It was therefore necessary to
incorporate a high degree of inter-participant
coordination into phase II. This prevented
participants from contacting companies in an
awkward, haphazard, or uncoordinated manner. To
accomplish this, each participant was informed
about the specific company choices of all other
participants that happened to coincide with their
own. Phase I1 was subsequently kicked off and the
"virtual marketplace" of technical-level
communications between the participants and
technical points-of-contact at each company became
active. The virtual technology marketplace of
potential buyers and sellers is depicted in figures 3
and 4. It was originally intended that lead
participants would travel and visit high potential
companies at some point during their respective
phase II processes. However, due to the absence of
travel funds, only telephone, electronic, and other
non-physical means were available.
In phase II, lead participants used the limited
information provided in the appendix to _et a
preliminary sense of their companies' necds in order
to prepare for introductory discussions with the
respective
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Figure 3: Phase Il virtual start-up configuration.
CommTech Phase II
S&E Initiated Interactions
Figure 4: Virtual marketplace activity near the planned Phase II to Phase III transition point.
technical points of contact. The aim of this initial
conversation was to quickly develop a more in-depth
technical understanding of a company's
product/process development needs - and vice-versa
[+or the company. Each lead participant (together
with his/her company technical point-of-contact)
used this deeper understanding to make a rapid and
accurate assessment of whether his/her particular
technology and/or capabilities might match a
company's need. The telephone interactions with
companies were done accordin,g to a sequential
contacl strategy to avoid raising (any company's)
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expectations that could not be met. Therefore,
when a match was found, the participant would
cease his/her sequential contact process at that
point. Further telephone contacts occurred only if
the lead participant were willing to assume the
additional responsibility that would result from the
discovery of another match. Capability
demonstrations were provided at a company's
request if the lead participant thought the interaction
held promise- and funds were available. These
demonstrations were paid for as needed with the
lead participant's CommTech funds allotment.
Although phase II had a planned duration of three
months, it was expected that in many cases it would
be necessary to extend this phase for an additional
three months to allow slower-to-develop
relationships to coalesce. Similar reasoning was
applied to phase III.
through fiscal year 1997. Here, the participant's"
ability to deliver on his/her commitment became
critical. The challenge all lead participants faced at
this point was incorporating scheduled, non-
aerospace support obligations into their "higher
priority" aerospace work schedules.
In addition to the success/risk factors mentioned
with respect to phase II above, it was recognized
that overall success during stage 2. in particular
phase IV, depended largely on the degree of
relevance or importance each lead participant's
functional manager attached to non-aerospace
interactions. This constituted an additional risk
factor that in several cases may have negatively
impacted the performance and output of stage 2.
RESULTS OF IMPLEMENTATION PHASES
After a "technical" match between technology need
and capability (or demand and supply) was secured,
discussions shifted to the "business" level. In other
words, phase II transitioned into phase HI. In phase
II, those participants who were fortunate enough to
discover a company whose needs matched their
capabilities proceeded to phase III, Those who did
not terminated their participation in the program
with a clear and measurable eftbrt and contribution
to show for it. Phase III ended, on an individual
basis, when NASA and a particular company
officially signed a formal Space Act Agreement.
This agreement represented NASA's legal obligation
to deliver specific technologies/support to that
company at a specified cost and schedule.
Phase III participants who successfully negotiated
and established an agreement transitioned into phase
IV. Phase IV had a planned duration extending
Twenty-six (26) scientists/engineers responded to
the phase I solicitation. ()f these, 16 applied as
individuals and 10 as teams. In addition, 9
applicants had experience in non-aerospace
technology transfer while 17 had no experience.
These applicants selected a total of 73 companies to
explore in phase II of which 58 (or 79 percent) were
chosen from the appendix, and 15 (21 percent) were
included by some experienced applicants. Figure 5
provides additional aggregate information on
industry sectors and regional sources.
Figure 6 portrays the cumulative totals and the
various rates at which the scientists and engineers
initiated their company interactions during phase I1.
As shown, 125 out of a possible maximum of 128 (or
98 percent) company interactions (the total count
resulting from the
• 25 Phase II Participants Identified
• 15 as Individuals, 10 as Teams
• 9 with ENTT- And 16 without ENTT"
48 Total Participants
_xDer_ence _n Non-aarospace leCrlnokogy I tanager
• 73 Companies* Selected
For Exploration In Phase II
• 58 Selected tram the 142 in the Appendix
15 Brought in by Experienced Participants
• Surtace Transportation Sector .... 37%
Environmental Sector .................. 36%
Bioengineering Sector ................ 27%
Prcau, ceO an average el 5 companies per Lea_ Paalcloan_
baSed on a IOlal of 128 Can_anl@s including overlapping seleclion_s
Company Data By Region
Mid-West .............. 36%
Mid-Continent ...... 22%
South East ........... 19%
Norlh East ............ 11%
Far West ............... 7%
Mid Atlantic .......... 5%
• Company Data Sources
FITTC's .......... 58%
RTI ................ 20%
S&E's ............ 22%
Figure 5: Summary of Phase I aggregate input/output results.
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128
100
S&E initiated
and Reported
Company
Interactions
5O
.................................................................... Maximum .......................................................................................
12S •
• 26 Lead S&E's in Phase II /• Average of 5 Companies per Lead Participant
7B
Cumulative39 Totals6_ 71 74
37
15j
Previously Established Interaclions
E
May June July Aug
1995
Figure 6: Phase II effort expended, and rate of expenditure, by participating scientists and engineers.
overlapping selections of the same company by
different participants) were recorded by August 7,
1995. At the end of phase II, eleven (11) lead
participants had successfully established
relationships, which could be transitioned into,
phase IlI.
The development and completion of technical-level
discussions varied widely from participant to
participant. As a result, the transition from phasc 11
to phase III was managed on a case-by-case basis,
since each participant progressed at a different rate
due to differences in company (oroanizational)
interface structures. Out of the initial 26 lead
participants who entered phase II. and the eleven
who progressed to phase III, four Space Act
Agreements were established. Basically, one
agreement was generated for every 6.5 participants
that entered the program in phase I.
As mentioned previously, it was expected that a
large fraction of lead participants would not progress
from phase II to phase II1. For that matter, even
fewer were expected to progress from phase III to
phase IV. It must be emphasized though, that the
lack of success in phases II or III did not constitute
failure. Thai is why one of the critical measures
used in recording CommTech's overall performance
was the effort expended by all participants during.
phases II and III.
Results for phase IV in the fi)rm of success stories
based on market introduction of derived
products/processes, commercialization activities,
etc.. are not yet available.
Performance Measurement Technique
Formulation
As indicated earlier, tracking and measurement
techniques would be devised in phase IV. In that
regard+ the private/public investment ratio was
formulated to provide a future means of providing
cycle lo cycle performance comparisons. It was
found that it would be useful for the CommTech
program to have a single overall program
performance metric that could be used as a general
perlkwmance indicator or index.
The private/public investment ratio (PPIR) is written
as"
PPIR = lu,r,,_te/Ip,m, c
where:
I_,,,,,. = The total "private dollar investment" in one
or more technology transfer and commercialization
objectives;
and,
lp,,m,_= The total "public dollar investment" in one
or more technology transfer objectives.
If the process of demand driven technology transfer
and is considered a "production" process, then ln_,.,_.
and Ipum,,. can perhaps be determined from the
following two equations. (The specific functions
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representedby eachtermin eachequation,along
with therelevantorassociatedstage2 phases,are
giveninparenthesesbelow):
I,_,,¢=A + fl H_ WI Y L,, + fL.H_. W,. Y Ei + tp Hp Wp
Y' Pi +fm Hm Wm _ Mk
{Ipnv,t_.= Transfer (phase IIl)+ Transfer (phase III)+
Transfer (phase II/IV)+ Transfer &
Commercialization (phase IV)+ Commercialization
(post phase IV)}
and,
Ip.H,_.= D + fm Hm W,. _ M k + 1_, I'_, W_. Y _ + fj
W! ._ Lh
{Ip, h_,,= Transfer (phase II)+ Transfer (stage 1/phase
I)+ Transfer (phase II)+ Transfer (phase III)}
where the stated "labor" and "capital .... factors of
production" and their associated "price"
determinants are described by:
A = The private dollar amount committed to fund an
established (Reimbursable or Cooperative) Space
Act Agreement;
D = The public dollar amount expended to provide a
capability demonstration to a particular company;
|_t. e. p.,,, ml = Inflation factors to adjust each term:
_._. p...... , = The number of hours needed to perform
each of the key functions, respectively;
W,. _.. _:.., ,_,_ = The hourly wage rates of each
respective functional area (as a function of
government, company or industry origin);
Lh = The number of legal personnel needed to
establish the technology transfer agreement;
F_ = The number of engineering personnel needed to
demonstrate and/or transfer the technology (public
and private); and/or to incorporate the transferred
technology into a new or existing product design
(private);
Pi = The number of production personnel needed to
actually produce the new or modified product
(private); and
Mk = The number of marketing personnel needed to
promote and introduce CommTech (public); and,
position and develop a promotion and pricing
strategy for the new/modified product (private).
The two equations are derived from the economic
theory of production. The validity of this approach
remains to be demonstrated in practice. This of
course depends on whether the necessary input data
would actually be provided by (any or all)
participating companies
It was beyond the scope of the CommTech program
first cycle objectives to gather all the above
investment data. As a result, a PPIR based on the
simple "A/D" approximation (see Table 1), was
determined only to serve as a rough point of
departure or baseline. In the future, however,
detailed, individual and aggregate PPIR's would
need to be estimated during Phase III, and then
adjusted and finalized during Phase IV.
It was understood that companies generally tended
not to track unpatented/unlicensed technology
transfer from source to end product application and
commercialization. As a result, a company's
technology transfer and commercialization process
(cost) data tend to dissipate. Because of this. the
required process data (above) would have to be
acquired from a company during each relevant phase
(II, III, and IV).
RESULTS SUMMARY
Table 1 displays a summary of the metrics resulting
from each of the phases in stage 2. As noted
previously, the initial 26 phase II participants
produced a participant/agreement ratio of 6.5 (based
on 4 agreements), or 2.2 with respect to phase HI
(based on 6 agreements). For all 6 phase 11I
agreements, the cost was $22K per agreement, or
$26K per project, with respect to the total $130K
(phase II/phase III) for demonstration expenditures.
The private/public investment ratio (PPIR)
described in the above section was formulated as a
key parameter or metric by which CommTech
performance could gauged and compared over time.
This ratio was designed to be a measure of the
aggregate efficiency of the program - the higher the
PPIR, the greater the efficiency. A detailed, first
cycle PPIR, however, could not be determined since
the methodology was developed as an output of this
first cycle for application with future cycles.
Instead. a simplified approximation is calculated
and given below as a rough performance measure
and basis for comparison with future cycles.
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Table 1: First cycle Stage 2 summary of results.
° ° i_U
_'_ _
o g g _- s
Phaselll 13 _ _ 16 $60K _,_'_._ 6 ,_\N\,%\"_ 2.2 2.6 ._%,._ .%_%%,.\_
Includes 3 new participants who entered Ihe program in FYg6
• Program was open to all NASA Glenn S&E's 26 applications were submilted
Eleverl (t 1 ) Irom initial 26 phase II participants plus 2 later addilions
Market research cosl estimate (NASA Headquarters (RTTC's & RTI) contract/lask obligation)
- Includes estimB_te on all fully negotiated signed and unsigned FY97 Agreements
" Simplified estimale shown based On Pnvate Inveslmerll/Public Inveslmerll dala in Table
Four (4) agreemenls were generated by the inlhal 26 phase It parllcipants
8 Includes estimate orl all sfaded and expected FYg7 pro_ects
9 Based on 4 agreements (see note #7)
TBD To be determined
In a strict sense, technology transfer was considered
to have occurred only where phase IV was either in
progress or was completed. The information
exchanged in the numerous telephone interactions
which occurred during phase II were considered a
measure of effort only and were not considered
technology transfer. In this first CommTech cycle
therefore, only five cases of successful technology
transfer (or interaction) arc recorded.
No commercialization successcs have yet been
recorded. Commercialization can bc defined as the
creation and/or modification, and introduction into
the marketplace of a product or process. Lonk_
(1999) offers some insight into the timeframes,
challcn_cs and complexities involved in new
product/process technology commercialization.
Such timcframes appear to realistically range
between 5 and 15 years. Whcther the five candidate
technology transfcr cases mentioned above will
achieve commercialization success is largely
dependent on the respective companies' market and
strategic business interests. In other words,
commercialization is in the domain of the private
sector.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The potential usefulness, broad applicability and
measurability of the CommTech methodology wcrc
demonstrated. All stated objectives were addressed.
The most important factor contributing to success
appeared to be the availability of internal R&D
funding to support capability demonstrations. As a
result, NASA R&D fundcd technoh)gy capability
demonstrations (in responsc to requests l'rom high
potential non-aerospace clients) were a built-in,
critical component of this first program cycle
conductcd at NASA Glenn.
If a second, similar or larger scope program cycle is
undertaken sometime in the future (within NASA
Glenn, another NASA Center, or throughout the
entire agency if desired), then the folh)wing
recommendations or considerations might produce
better results:
The initial program cycle was conducted by one
individual serving as program manager. Certain
activities in Stage 1 and Stage 2 (phase II and
111, in particular) would probably benefit from
more specializcd and focused support, in this
regard.
The effectiveness of phase ll may be improved
if the inherent time lag between the discovery of
a (product/process) technology problem/need,
and the idcntification and application of an
appropriate candidate technology solution, can
bc reduced. In order to minimize this time lag,
the rate at which the lormal stage 1 and stage
2/phase I participant selcction proccsses arc
accomplishcd must be accelerated or
maximized.
Company/client awareness of technology
capabilities is of particular importance. It is
possible that, given more lead-time, combincd
with more information about CommTech
objectives, market research sources might
provide more effcctivc support in this area.
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Theproductivityof thismethodologymightbe
increasedif leadparticipantswereabletomeet
withselectcompaniesandobtaina face-to-face
understandingof their respectiveproblemsor
needs.Theadditionaltravelcostor investment
expenditureincurredwouldprobablyresultin
higherqualityinteractions,whichmightin turn
producebetter,moreproductiverelationships.
Finally,the methodologypresentedin this report
appearsto bebroadlyapplicablewithinmostpublic
sectortechnologyproducingentities- i.e., other
governmentagencies(andperhapscertainprivate
sectorentitiesaswell). Presumably,someminor
modificationswould most likely be necessary,
dependingon how the particularorganization
functionsandwhatit wishesto accomplishin the
areaof technologytransferandcommercialization.
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